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Free Speech and 
Equal Protection 
In many places, laws seeking to control 
prostitution forbid not the act itself, but 
soliciting for it. The Washington, D.C. 
statute, thought by some to be model 
legislation because of its sex-neutral 
language, is one of them. In a decision not 
reported elsewhere than in L&SA, how-
ever, that statute has been found to violate 
prostitutes' freedom of speech and privacy, 
and to deny them equal protection of the 
laws. United States v. Moses, encompass-
ing Criminal Nos. 17778-72, 21346-72, 
18338-72, 34472-72, 36618-72, and 
39272-72, was handed down November 3, 
1972, in the courtroom of Judge Charles 
W. Halleck, Superior Court of the District 
of Columbia, Criminal Division. 
The Government has appealed the case to 
the D.C. Court of Appeals, where oral 
arguments on all the points dec;ided below 
are expected to be scheduled for the fall 
of 1973. The case is being handled chiefly by 
Marcia Greenberger of the Center for Law 
and Social Policy, and Carl Fogelberg of 
the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights 
Under Law. 
Opinion 
The defendants have been charged with violating Section 
22-2701 of the District of Columbia Code.1 The matter 
came before the Court on motions by the defendants to 
dismiss the informations on the. grounds that § 22-2701 
violates their right to privacy encompassed in the First, 
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments to the 
Constitution of the United States; that the statute 
abridges their freedom of speech in contravention of the 
First Amendment to the Constitution; that the discrim-
inatory enforcement of the Statute denies the defendants 
the equal protection of the laws; and that the statutory 
penalty for the offense charged constitutes cruel and un-
usual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment 
to the Constitution. 
For reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that 
D.C. Code§ 22-2701 violates the defendants' rights to 
privacy, freedom of speech, and equal protection. The 
motions to dismiss should therefore be granted. 
At the outset it must be recognized that the crime con-
templated by this statute is a purely verbal offense. The 
defendants have pointed out, and the government has 
conceded, that the threshold element of this offense is 
no more than the spoken word. Prostitution per se is not 
a crime in the District ofColumbia.2 As Lieutenant 
Richards, Chief of the Prostitution, Perversion, and Ob-
scenity section of the Metropolitan Police, Morals Divi-
sion, testified at the hearing on these motions, a con-
summated act of prostitution would not be prosecuted 
under§ 22-2701 in the absence of a verbal solicitation. 
It is simply the solicitation itself, the mere exchange of 
words, which constitutes the offense. Accordingly, the 
crime for which these defendants were arrested was 
simply the speaking of certain words to police officers 
artfully holding themselves out as willing listeners. 
It is axiomatic in our Anglo-American jurisprudence that 
the proper subject of criminal punishment is behavior, 
not speech. As the Supreme Court said recently in 
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518 {1972), the First 
Amendment prohibits the States (and a fortiori the 
federal government) from punishing "the use of words or 
language not within 'narrowly limited classes of speech,' 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942)." 
405 U.S. at 521-522. Since Justice Holmes first enunci-
ated the test in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 
(1919), the issue in every case has been "whether the 
words used are used in such circumstances and are of 
such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that 
they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress 
has a right to prevent." 249 U.S. at 52. 
The concept underlying this test is not limited to cases of 
"subversive advocacy." Reversing the conviction under a 
"breach of peace" statute of one who hurled abrasive 
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epithets at an angry crowd, the Court in Terminiello v. 
Chicago, 331U.S.1 (1949), said: 
"Speech is often provocative and challenging. It 
may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and 
have profound unsettling effects as it presses 
for the acceptance of an idea. That is why free-
dom of speech, though not absolute (citing 
Chaplinsky), is nevertheless protected against 
censorship or punishment, unless shown likely 
to produce a clear and present danger of a seri-
ous substantive evil that rises far above public 
inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest." 
337 U.S. at 4. 
Words may often have undesirable import for certain 
members of a large and pluralistic society, but the First 
Amendment forbids the imposition of any restraint on 
speech unless the words themselves are tantamount to 
"substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent," 
Schenck v. United States, supra, at 52. (Emphasis added.) 
It is manifest that liberty is a heavy counterbalance in 
weighing whether an evil is sufficiently grave to warrant 
its suppression by government. Such censorship may be 
justifiable when the speech "is directed to inciting or pro-
ducing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or 
produce such action." Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 
444, 447 (1969) (Emphasis supplied). This principle is 
analogous to the common law doctrine that solicitation 
to commit a crime may itself be punished, for the solicita-
tion merges with the action. 
Nor does the First Amendment work an automatic bar to 
the regulation of speech which, in the words of the United 
States Court of Appeals for this Circuit, 
"creates a substantial risk of provoking violence, 
or ... is, under contemporary community 
standards, so grossly offensive to members of the 
public who actually overhear it as to amount to 
a nuisance." Williams v. District of Columbia, 
136 U.S. App. D.C. 56, 64; 419 F. 2d 638, 646. 
But the threshold for invoking such restrictions is high, 
commensurate with the value of the freedoms at stake. 
Concurring in Eisenstadt v. Baird, a recent case treating 
the same fundamental issue now before us (the scope of 
constitutional protection for sexual activity), Justice 
Douglas delineated the permissible range of speech: 
"The First Amendment protects the opportun-
ity to persuade to action whether that action 
be unwise or immoral, or whether the speech 
incites to action. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. 
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444; Edwards v. South Carolina, 
372 U.S. 279; Terminiello v. Chicago, supra." 
405 U.S. 438, at 459 (1972) (emphasis 
supplied). 
Even speech which is obscene under current standards 
may not constitutionally be subject to a wholesale pro-
hibition. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); 
Williams v. District of Columbia, supra. 
Speech must directly engender a concrete evil, such as a 
criminal act, a breach of the peace, or a public nuisance, 
before it loses the protection of the First Amendment. 
See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, supra; Cohen v. California, 
403 U.S. 15 (1971); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 
(1971); Edwards v. South Carolina, 312 U.S. 229 (1963); 
Williams v. District of Columbia, supra. In applying this 
standard to the statute and the charge in the instant case, 
the Court must determine what concrete evil "which 
Congress has a right to prevent" may be generated by the 
speech here penalized. 
Prostitution per se is not a crime in the District of 
Columbia,3 nor has it ever been.4 Accordingly, the com-
mon law doctrine of solicitation sanctioned by the First 
Amendment cannot justify D.C. Code§ 22-2701. While 
solicitation to commit a crime may properly be pro-
scribed, it would be anomalous to punish someone for 
soliciting another to commit an act which is itself not a 
crime, and that is precisely what is involved here. 
It has been suggested, however, that the completed act 
of prostitution, while not in itself criminal, necessarily 
entails fornication, sodomy, or adultery, or some combi-
nation thereof, each of which is presently a crime in the 
District of Columbia. See D.C. Code§§ 22-1002, 
22-3502, and 22-301, respectively. Thus, so the argument 
runs, solicitation for prostitution may properly be viewed 
as an inchoate offense leading to the substantive offenses 
of fornication, sodomy, or adultery. Accepting arguendo 
the suggestion that solicitation for prostitution may be 
characterized as solicitation for these "criminal" of-
fenses, we must then consider whether these acts are in 
fact "substantive evils that Congress has a right to pre-
vent." Such a determination must first be made in order 
to reach the basic issues posed by the instant prosecutions. 
Upon examination of the relevant law, this Court con-
cludes that the statutory proscription against fornication, 
sodomy, and adultery engaged in by consenting adults is 
an unconstitutional invasion of the right to privacy as 
comprised in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution. Since 
the privacy doctrine is a critical basis for the constitu" 
tional claims here asserted, it must of necessity be con-
sidered here in some depth. 
The right to privacy encompasses the constitutional 
right of the individual to control the use and function of 
his or her own body. This principle found eloquent ex-
pression in a Supreme Court opinion handed down over 
eighty years ago in Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford, 
141 U.S. 250 (1891): 
"No right is held more sacred, or is more care-
fully guarded, by the common law, than the 
right of every individual to the possession and 
control of his own person, free from all restraint 
or interference of others, unless by clear and 
unquestionable authority of law." 141 U.S. at 
251. 
More recently, the Supreme Court in Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381U.S.479 (1965), located the source of 
"zones of privacy" immune from governmental encroach-
145 
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ment in the penumbras of specific guarantees of the Bill 
of Rights, "formed by emanations from those guarantees 
that help give them life and substance." 381 U.S. at 484. 
In the Griswold case, the Court held th1t the state's regu-
lation of access to contraception information and methods 
violated the right to privacy protected by the Constitu-
tion. Griswold adjudicated claims involving a married 
couple; and, as a result, the opinion was couched in terms 
of marital, as well as sexual, privacy. But the Court has 
subsequently made it clear that the mantle of inviola-
bility thrown around personal intimacy and bodily in-
tegrity was not meant to protect only married persons: 
"If the right of privacy means anything it is the 
right of the individual, married or single, to be 
free from unwarranted governmental instru-
sion ... "Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 at 
453 (1972) (emphasis in original). 
Judicial respect for the right to privacy has not been con-
fined to the specific issues surrounding the use of various 
contraceptive methods. In Stanley v. Georgia, supra, the 
Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a state statute 
making criminal the mere private possession of so-called 
"obscene" materials. The court observed that any justifi-
cations that might obtain for other statutory regulation 
of obscenity could not support this interference with 
one's right to personal choice in the selection of materials 
for private reading or viewing. The attempt to censor 
the books or films that an individual may consume in 
private for his own satisfaction was adjudged a patently 
unconstitutional effort "to control the moral content of 
a person's thoughts." 394 U.S. at 565 (footnote omitted). 
The Court concluded that the First Amendment, one of 
the great specific sources from which the right to privacy 
derives its contours, Griswold v. Connecticut, supra, at 
484, prohibits such governmental intrusion into the realm 
of personal privacy. Stanley v. Georgia, supra at 564. 
As the government may not dictate personal tastes in 
reading and viewing matter, neither may it abridge the 
individual's right to associate with whomever he chooses 
and to enjoy privacy in those associations.N.A.A.CP. v. 
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). These rights, scrupulously 
guarded when asserted on behalf of political organiza-
tions, have recently been vindicated in federal court de-
cisions dealing with unconventional social associations 
and living arrangements. In Moreno v. Department of 
Agriculture, 345 F. Supp. 310 (D.D.C. 1972), a three-
judge court found that a Congressional enactment deny-
ing foodstamps to needy households consisting of unre-
lated persons violated the rights to privacy and freedom 
of association. The law apparently was designed to pre-
vent "hippie communes" from having the benefit of the 
foodstamp program, regardless of objective standards of 
need. The District Court recognized that such an attempt 
to regulate nontraditional living arrangements is incon-
sistent with fundamental values of privacy and personal 
autonomy. 
Another District Court in an analogous holding declared 
that a police department could not constitutionally deny 
employment as a police officer on the sole ground that 
the applicant was a practicing nudist who gathered with 
fellow nudists on weekends. That some may consider 
nudism "repulsive and vulgar" was deemed insufficient 
to warrant the police department's practical intrusion 
into the applicant's right to associate with persons of his 
choice. Bruns v. Pomerleau, 319 F. Supp. 58 (D. Md. 
1970). Similarly, the District Court for the District of 
Columbia applied the rights of privacy and free associ-
ation to shield an individual's unorthodox sexual activity 
from governmental scrutiny. In Ulrich v. Laird, F. 
Supp. , 40 U.S.L.W. 2165 (1971), the court 
ordered the security clearance of an avowed homosexual 
restored despite his refusal to answer intimate questions 
about his sex life. 
These and analogous cases illustrate the expanding judicial 
invocation of the right to privacy in matters of intimate 
personal preference. In effecting this expansion, the 
courts have taken cognizance of dramatic changes in 
social conditions that have made legal doctrines once 
appropriate grow unsuited to contemporary society. Cf. 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) and Brown v. 
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also 
Franklin v. State, 257 So.2d 21 (Fla. 1971), at 23, and 
Abele v.Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800 (D. Conn. 1972). An 
ever-widening range of activities involving the individual's 
right to bodily integrity and self-determination have been 
found by the courts to lie within the sheltered "zone of 
privacy." Much of this protected behavior naturally 
concerns sexuality, traditionally an area of special inti-
macy. Recognizing the need to keep such personal conduct 
free from outside interference, courts have been steadily 
broadening the scope of legal protection for individual 
sexual matters. This evolution is unmistakable; it mirrors 
the growing jealous regard for personal autonomy in an 
increasingly intrusive urbanized society. In Doe v. Scott, 
321 F. Supp. 1385 (N.D. Ill. 1971), a three-judge court 
summarized Griswold's progeny as follows: 
"We cannot distinguish the interest asserted by 
the plaintiffs in this case from those asserted in 
Griswold . .. We believe that Griswold and 
related cases establish that matters pertaining 
to procreation, as well as to marriage, the fam-
ily, and sex are surrounded by a zone of privacy 
which protects activities concerning such mat-
ters from unjustified governmental intrusion." 
321 F. Supp. at 1389-1390. 
In light of contemporary beliefs and conditions, the sex-
ual activities of consenting adults, married and single, 
must now be seen inexorably to reside within the protec-
tion of the right to privacy. 
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The recognition of the right to privacy in current case law 
represents the vindication of principles enunciated more 
than a hundred years ago by the philosopher and libertar-
ian, John Stuart Mill: 
" ... the only principle for which power can 
rightfully be exercised over any member of a 
civilized community, against his will, is to pre-
vent harm to others. His own good, either 
physical or moral, is not sufficient warrant. 
He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or 
forbear because it will be better for him to do 
so, because it will make him happier, because, 
in the opinion of others, to do so would be 
wise or even right. These are good reasons for 
remonstrating with him, but not for compelling 
him or visiting him with any evil in case he do 
otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from 
which it is desired to deter him must be calcu-
lated to produce evil to someone else. The only 
part of the conduct of anyone for which he is 
amenable to society is that which concerns 
others. In the part which merely concerns him-
self, his independence is, of right, absolute. 
Over himself, over his own body and mind, the 
individual is sovereign. " 5 
Mill's formula, permitting governmental interefernce with 
the individual's conduct only when that conduct harms 
others, is reflected in the constitutional standard declar-
ing that government may not inhibit the exercise of 
fundamental rights, such as the right to privacy, unless 
such restriction is clearly necessary to the accomplish-
ment of some compelling state interest. Justice Goldberg 
reiterated this test in his concurring opinion in Griswold: 
"In a long series of cases this Court has held that 
where fundamental personal liberties are involved, 
they may not be abridged by the States simply 
on a showing that a regulatory statute has some 
rational relationship to the effectuation of a 
proper state purpose. 'Where there is a significant 
encroachment upon personal liberty, the State 
may prevail only upon showing a subordinating 
interest which is compelling.' Bates v. little Rock, 
361 U.S. 516, 524. The law must be shown nec-
essary, and not merely rationally related, to the 
accomplishment of a permissible state policy. 
(citations omitted)." 381 U.S. at 497. 
The compelling state interest test is a stringent standard, 
not satisfied by equivocal demonstrations of potential 
harms, nor even by relatively pressing concerns. Even 
where a considerable state interest exists, recent court 
decisions striking down statutes prohibiting abortions 
have amply illustrated that such interests must be sub-
stantial indeed to overcome the strong rights of privacy 
and personal autonomy which our society recognizes 
with regard to sexual matters. See, e.g., Abele v. Markle 
II, 351 F. Supp. 224 (D. Conn., September 20, 1972) 
(Civ. No. B-521); Abele v. Markle I, 342 F. Supp. 800 
(D. Conn., April 18, 1972); Poe v. Menghini, 339 F. Supp. 
986 (D. Kan. 1972); Y. W.C.A. v. Kugler, 343 F. Supp. 
1048 (D.N.J. 1972); Doe v.Scott,321 F. Supp. 1385 
(N.D.Ill. 1971), appeal docketed, 401U.S.969 (April 6, 
1971); Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D.Tex. 1970). 
All of the foregoing cases were decided by three-judge 
federal panels. See also Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 
293 (E.D.Wis. 1970), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. l (1970); 
and California v. Belous, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 458 P.2d 194 
(1969).* 
Various conjecturable purposes have been adduced for 
the maintenance of anti-abortion statutes. For example, 
surgical abortion procedures, like any operation, may in-
volve some medical risk. Moreover, although there is a 
great deal of moral and ethical disagreement on the issue, 
there is at least an arguable state interest in regulating 
medical actions which terminate the human gestation 
process. Pronatalist groups still loudly assert the supposed 
rights of the fetus or embryo. Nevertheless, the courts 
have held that even these interests, which have substan-
tially more strength than any interest that can be ad-
vanced to justify the regulation of private sexual conduct 
between consenting adults, are insufficient to justify 
denying a woman the right to determine whether to 
bear children. 
It thus becomes important to ask whether infringement 
of the privacy of consenting adults engaged in any of the 
sexual conduct now under examination is essential to the 
effectuation of some overriding state interest. Absent a 
strong showing of such interest, the abridgement of these 
personal liberties is intolerable. 
This Court is unable to perceive any current compelling 
interest to justify the criminalization of fornication, 
sodomy, or adultery. The government advances none. On 
the contrary, the almost complete lapse of enforcement 
of the laws against such consesual behavior demonstrates 
the government's own recognition that no indicable pub-
lic evil is occasioned by these acts. One need only com-
pare the thousands of divorces granted each year on 
proof of adultery with the nearly total absence of crim-
inal prosecutions for that offense to perceive the atrophy 
of such laws. Lieutenant Richards of the Morals Division 
testified that he cannot recall a single prosecution for 
fornication or adultery since he joined the force. More-
over, a recent policy statement of the Metropolitan 
Police directs that arrests be discontinued for acts of 
sodomy between consenting adults in private.6 It is 
incontrovertible that the criminal statutes proscribing 
fornication, adultery, and sodomy have been drastically 
eroded, at least as applied to acts between consenting 
*See also, of course, the superseding Supreme 
Court decision in Roe v. Wade,410 U.S. , 93 
S.Ct. 705, 41 U.S.L.W. 4213 (Jan. 23, 1973). 
Abele v. Markle (sub nom. Markle v. Abele) 
and several other district court abortion judg-
ments were subsequently vacated. 410 U.S. , 
93 S.Ct.1417, 41 U.S.L.W. 3459 (Feb. 26, 1973). 
147 
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adults in private. In light of the privacy doctrine, of 
course, this is a fortunate decay. The Court finds the 
observations of a contemporary legal scholar particularly 
apposite to this phenomenon: 
"Ever since the first two Kinsey reports ... 
·revealed an incredibly wide gap between the 
law's expectations and the people's actual 
practices as to sexual conduct, the law of sexual 
offenses has lost its major crutch: popular sup-
port. The population flouts the law; it thereby 
indicates its dissatisfaction with it. A law with-
out popular support cannot be effective."7 
In view of the sexual revolution of the past decade, the 
almost universal availability of contraceptive devices, and 
the proliferation of "alternative life styles," it is incon-
gruous to assert a compelling governmental interest in 
restricting voluntary sexual conduct to Victorian con-
fines. In fact, no such overriding interest has been demon-
strated. 
Since fornication, adultery, sodomy, and similar consen-
sual sexual behavior by adults are properly within the pro-
tected "zones of privacy," with no compelling state in-
terest to warrant their criminalization, they are not 
"substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." 
Therefore, they may not be used to justify a prohibition 
on words spoken to solicit their performance. This Court 
does not choose to presume caprice on the part of the 
government, however. Continuing prosecutions for 
soliciting prostitution (in the absence of enforcement of 
these other sexual prohibitions) therefore suggest a gov-
ernmental belief that within the context of prostitution, 
these otherwise innocuous activities entail consequences 
sufficiently harmful to generate .an overriding interest in 
their restriction. Yet beyond the bald assertion that so-
liciting prostitution is "malum in se," the government 
has suggested no evil precipitated by the sexual activities 
of the prostitute and customer so compelling as to war-
rant suppression of conversations leading to the comple-
tion of these voluntary acts. 
In applying the strict "compelling state interest" test, it 
is unnecessary to consider all conceivable interests that 
might exist, although not shown by the government and 
which might have been the actual object of the legislation. 
Nonetheless, even though the government has proffered 
no other justifiable state interest in placing a statutory 
prohibition on solicitation for prostitution, the Court has 
considered other potential interests which have been 
discussed by counsel for defendants as well as widely 
treated in various publications. An examination of the 
most ubiquitous of these claims follows. 
The lore of the harms occasioned by prostitution is as 
pervasive in our culture as it is unsubstantiated by hard 
data. Indeed, as Jerome Skolnick has said of this area of 
legislation, "rather than fact determining policy, policy 
decides fact. " 8 
Nowhere does this assessment seem more apposite than 
in the alleged threat posed to community health by 
prostitution. Even prescinding from the argument that it 
is a citizen's right to choose not to protect his own 
health, we are still cited to nothing which supports the 
proposition that sexual relations between prostitutes and 
their clients pose any unique threat to the health and well-
being of either party. Over a decade ago, it was remarked 
in a United Nations publication that" [T] he prostitute 
ceases to be the major factor in the spread of venereal 
disease in the United States today."9 This general con-
clusion has been firmly ratified by knowledgeable physi-
cians and investigators in the field of public health. Be-
cause research has so consistently negated the primacy 
of prostitution in the transmission of venereal disease, 
and because the popular belief to the contrary is never-
theless held with the tenacity usually invested in notions 
born of dogma rather than of science, let us pause to 
consider the evidence. 
Following her comprehensive study of prostitution in 
Seattle, Professor Jennifer James of the University of 
Washington School of Medicine observed that: 
"Public Health advisors believe that prostitutes 
are well-educated about venereal disease prob-
lems and are watchful for them. They are aware 
of preventive techniques which include using 
prophylactics, checking customers, and seeking 
medical care, because a reputation as one who 
is infected would cut down the relatively large 
volume of repeat business which most prostitutes 
tutes depend on."10 
Dr. James further remarks, in a conclusion shared by 
many of her colleagues, that "Public Health advisors be-
lieve that the increase in venereal disease is related more 
to a general change in sexual values unaccompanied by 
health education ... " 11 Dr. William M. Edwards, Jr., 
Chief of the Bureau of Preventive Medicine, Nevada State 
Health Division, recently concurred in this view, saying: 
"The problem isn't in the house of prostitution; 
it's out in the general population ... Prostitutes 
are much more alert to the possibilities of infec-
tion and get examined very frequently." 12 
Dr. Edwards further indicated that the venereal disease 
rate among prostitutes is less than five per cent (5%), 
while among high school students age 15-19, the rate is 
twenty-five per cent (25%). Dr. R. Palmer Beasley of the 
University of Washington School of Public Health and 
Community Medicine similarly averred that" [m] ost 
venereal disease spread is not between prostitutes and 
their customers. Probably ninety per cent (90%) of ven-
ereal disease is unrelated to prostitution." Dr. Charles 
5
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Winick of C.C.N.Y. and the American Social Health Asso-
ciation, co-author of The Lively Commerce (New York, 
1972), was even more conservative in his estimate: 
"We know from many different studies that the 
amount of venereal disease attributable to pros-
titution is remaining fairly constant at a little 
under five per cent (5%), which is a negligible 
proportion compared to the amount of venereal 
disease that we have ... 13 
Statistics promulgated by the Public Health Service of 
the United States Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare further document the minor role of prostitution 
in spreading venereal disease: 
"In the United States during the 12-month peri-
od ending June 30, 1971, less than three per cent 
(3%) of more than 13 ,600 females diagnosed 
with infectious syphilis were prostitutes. " 14 
In Seattle during the three-year period preceding 1971, 
during which time all women arrested as prostitutes were 
medically examined, no more than one or two out of 
hundreds were found to have infectious syphilis and 
fewer than six per cent (6%) were infected with gonor-
rhea.15 Meanwhile, the gonorrhea rate increased fivefold 
among residents of Prince George's County, Maryland, in 
the last decade; and quadrupled in Arlington, Virginia, 
between 1969-1970 alone.16 
The viewpoint of the experts may easily be corroborated 
inferentially; for while the highest rate of venereal disease 
exists in the age group 15-30 (comprising eighty-four per 
cent (84%) of all reported venereal disease cases), the age 
group which most frequents prostitutes is 30-60 (seventy 
per cent (70%) of "johns" in Seattle).17 Nor is this age 
pattern for prostitutes' clientele by any means peculiar 
to Seattle, as other portraits of typical patrons will readily 
attest.18 As Robert M. Nellis of the San Francisco City 
Clinic succinctly put it: "Prostitution is not where it's at 
with V.D. today; it's Johnny next door and Susie up the 
street."19, 20 
Moreover, the present practices of the criminal justice 
administration system in the District of Columbia do not 
serve to inflate this Court's estimation of the compelling 
state interest in prohibiting solicitation in order to 
staunch the spread of venereal disease. Women arrested 
for soliciting prostitution in the District of Columbia, 
whether released on bond or citation or committed to the 
Women's Detention Center, do not routinely receive V.D. 
tests. (Interestingly enough, though, they are tested for 
current use of illegal drugs). They are returned to the 
community untreated for venereal disease if they are in-
fected, despite their arrest under a statute, one of the 
ostensible purposes of which is to control the spread of 
venereal disease. If the hazards are not great enough to 
warrant medical inspections of arrestees, it is tautological 
to assert that criminalization of the conduct for the pur-
pose of averting those hazards is an unwarranted infringe-
ment of liberty, especially in light of the fundamental 
rights involved. 
Even were this Court persuaded that prostitution is a 
major source of the proliferation of venereal disease, it is 
patently clear that this harm could be controlled by a 
more narrowly drawn statute, one not abridging privacy 
and personal liberties as does a total prohibition of solicit-
ing. Other nations have long had schemes requiring prosti-
tutes to register with health authorities, to have regular 
medical examinations, or to comply with other health 
regulations. In most of the counties of Nevada prostitu-
tion is legal in state-licensed houses with provision for 
medical maintenance. It is not this Court's purpose to 
encourage prostitution nor to advocate any such scheme 
of regulation; it is sufficient to note that whatever state 
interest is entailed here can adequately be protected by 
means short of prohibition of soliciting and the attendant 
deprivation of constitutional rights.21 In light of the fore-
going, the hypothetical public health rationale for§ 2701 
must fail. 
It is important to consider another potential government 
allegation, not here made but frequently advanced, and 
also wholly unsupported by any evidence in these cases, 
that banning solicitation can be constitutionally justified 
because prostitution is often Jinked with organized crime. 
Again we confront a proposition whose popular accept-
ance has survived Jong after the actual conditions which 
it may once have described. The Presidential Task Force 
Report on Organized Crime addresses itself directly to 
this question: 
"Prostitution ... plays a small and declining role 
in organized crime's operations ... Prostitution 
is difficult to organize, and discipline is hard to 
maintain. Several important convictions of or-
ganized crime figures in prostitution cases in the 
1930's and 1940's made the criminal executives 
wary of further participation. " 22 
Other writers in the field accord with this view. Dr. 
Charles Winick observes that" ... nowadays prostitution 
... is too visible an activity for organized crime - it's too 
dangerous. Therefore, organized crime has pretty much 
gotten out of the prostitution business."23 As another 
scholar added, " ... organized crime has more lucrative 
and less perilous enterprises available to it."24 These 
views were reiterated within the particular context of the 
District of Columbia by Lieutenant Charles Rinaldi in an 
interview conducted while he was chief of the Morals Div 
sion of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police: 
"There is no real organization of call girls here 
in Washington. Maybe there's a loose network, 
but only infrequently do you find one pimp with 
a couple of girls working for him. The Mafia 
isn't around here ... Anyway, prostitution just 
isn't profitable enough in Washington to keep 
any organization interested. " 25 
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The San Francisco Committee on Crime injects another 
dimension to the analysis: 
"It is also probable that if pros ti tu tion were not 
a crime, it would not be organized. In any event, 
a law enforcement policy of sweeping prosti-
tutes off the streets and into our courts is no 
way to keep organized crime out of prostitution. "26 
Furthermore, it is not clear that crimes commonly asso-
ciated with prostitution are primarily attributable to the 
prostitutes themselves. The San Francisco Committee on 
Crime rejects such a notion, saying: 
"(I] n short, society's effort to prevent crimes 
of violence associated with prostitution would 
be more effective by concentrating law enforce-
ment efforts on the pimps rather than on the 
girls, on the 'associated crimes' rather than 
prostitution. " 32 
Nor does a proscription of soliciting indirectly accom-
plish control of the pimps; on the contrary, the intrusion 
of the criminal law greatly augments the typical prosti-
tute's need for a pimp and his corresponding power to 
author wrongdoing. 
If the evidence in this area of inquiry is less than conclu-
sive, the law is not. To arrest and criminally prosecute a 
prostitute because of a possibility that crime-related ac-
tivity might be involved directly or indirectly is massively 
antithetical to traditional concepts of due process, equal 
protection, and individual liberty. The Supreme Court 
recently voided a Florida vagrancy statute which made 
similar assumptions about the criminal propensities of 
certain classes of people. In Papachristou v. City of Jack-
sonville, supra, Justice Douglas wrote for a unanimous 
Court: 
"A presumption that people who might walk or 
loaf or loiter or stroll or frequent houses where 
liquor is sold, or who are supported by their 
wives or who look suspicious to the police are 
to become future criminals is too precarious for 
a rule of law. The implicit presumption in these 
generalized vagrancy standards - that crime is 
being nipped in the bud - is too extravagant to 
deserve extended treatment. Of course, they are 
nets making easy the round-up of so-called un-
desirables. But the rule of law implies equality 
and justice in its application. Vagrancy laws of 
the Jacksonville type teach that the scales of 
justice are so tipped that even-handed admin-
istration of the law is not possible. The rule of 
law, evenly applied to minorities as well as 
majorities, to the poor as well as to the rich, is 
the great mucilage that holds society together." 
405 U.S. at 171. 
Within a context of the right to privacy and First Amend-
ment freedoms, the Court in Stanley v. Georgia, supra, 
reached an an~logous conclusion concerning prohibition 
of protected behavior to prevent possible related harms. 
A state 
" ... may no more prohibit mere possession of 
obscenity on the ground that it may lead to anti-
social conduct than it may prohibit the posses-
sion of chemistry books on the ground that they 
may lead to the manufacture of homemade 
spirits." 394 U.S. at 565. 
If indeed there is evidence that prostitution is sometimes 
coincident with certain crimes, there is also ample indica-
tion that the extension of the criminal law to soliciting 
significantly hinders application of legal sanctions to those 
very crimes. By the most fundamental precepts of our 
law, it is to those violent acts that such sanctions must 
directly be addressed. Endorsement of an alleged state 
interest which precisely inverts this proscriptive emphasis 
would be a perversion of justice in which this Court will 
not acquiesce. The rationale fails with its predecessors. 
The only other rationale advanced by the government to 
justify the regulation of speech involved in§ 22-2701 is 
the alleged need to keep prostitutes off the street. Such 
a contention is utterly unsatisfactory because if there is 
nothing illegal about being a prostitute or engaging in 
prostitution, the state naturally has no constitutional 
right to prohibit prostitutes from appearing in public. 
The government urges, however, that conversations aimed 
at contracting for sexual activities somehow harrass the 
public at large. Consequently, a careful consideration of 
the various aspects of this argument is in order. 
The Committee is presumably alluding to the need for 
structure and organization generated by the efforts nec-
essary to elude detection and combat legal prosecution. 
In such a situation, otherwise private entrepreneurs are 
forced toward alliances with underworld syndicates for 
"protection," while the attendant occasion for police 
corruption grows in ominous proportion. 
Another important perspective on the problem is sug-
gested by Professor Kingsley Davis: 
"Prostitution has probably declined as under-
world business in America; not only have de-
mand and supply slackened, but other activities, 
such as labor-union control, have proved im-
mensely profitable and easier to organize."27 
While this Court naturally expresses no view on the rela-
tionship of organized crime with organized labor, it is a 
conceivable affiliation no less logically plausible than that 
of organized crime and prostitution. However, one would 
expect to find few serious proponents of the abolition of 
labor unions in order to prevent their potential domina-
tion by criminal syndicates. Courts have, in fact, long 
held that society should regulate illegal conduct directly, 
rather than prohibit other activities on the ground that 
those activities are somehow, in some cases, connected 
with illegality. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 
U.S. 156 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
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Accordingly, even if prostitution were closely connected 
to organized crime, which a careful investigation demon-
strates is not the case in this jurisdiction, this Court could 
not properly support an absolute prohibition of consti-
tutionally protected conduct in order indirectly to sup-
press proscribed activity. This rationale too must fail. 
Closely allied with the foregoing alleged state interest in 
prohibiting solicitation of prostitution is the endeavor to 
inhibit crimes which may somehow be ancillary to prosti-
tution. By restricting prostitution, so the theory goes, 
one may also minimize the occurrence of related crimes 
against the person or property of either consenting party. 
While the logic of this analysis seems sound, the evidence 
is less than conclusive. The Seattle study remarks bluntly 
that: 
" ... prohibition of prostitution itself causes 
crime ... The prohibition ... has a double im-
pact. To the extent that prostitues believe their 
victims will not report a robbery or theft they 
will be encouraged to commit it. Further, prosti-
tutes, more than occasional victims of assaults 
by customers,28 are also discouraged from in-
volving the law."29 (footnote supplied.) 
Thus attachment of the stigma and penalties of the crim-
inal law to basically innocuous consensual conduct may 
actually deter application of such sanctions to genuinely 
harmful behavior. 
Nor is the alternative simply resignation to the criminal 
activity which may arise in conjunction with prostitution 
any more than to the crime which may be ancillary to 
the vending of goods or the practice of law. The San 
Francisco Committee on Crime was admirably direct in 
meeting this issue: 
"Bearing in mind the financial limits on put>llc 
resources available to combat crime, this is a 
poor area to apply 'consumer protection' 
against the consumer's own gullibility. The 
answer to prostitution-connected force, violence, 
or theft is that it is chargeable and punishable as 
a separate crime, independent of any act or 
solicitation of prostitution. " 30 
Stated most baldly, "(I] f prostitutes or pimps rob or 
beat patrons, the victims should charge robbery or bodily 
harm, not prostitution."31 It goes without saying that 
the prostitutes should also be free to charge robbery or 
bodily harm against patrons; they ought not to be de-
prived of protection of life and property simply because 
of their chosen "profession:" 
It must be observed initially that the government has of-
fered no evidence beyond unverified conjecture that any-
one is in fact subjected to unwanted solicitation by pros-
titutes. In these cases, the policemen holding themselves 
out as potential customers seeking solicitation can scarcely 
claim to have been offended or harrassed by any conver-
sation their subterfuge elicited. The Court ,of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit has approved the principle 
that the police officer, by virtue of his training and posi-
tion, is less free than the ordinary citizen to complain of 
supposedly offensive language. That Court noted with 
approbation the distinction drawn by the Model Penal 
Code between "offensively coarse utterances" which 
create a "public" annoyance, and instances of offensive 
language whereby "it is only the policeman's peace and 
quiet that are allegedly disturbed." Model Penal Code 
§250.1,Commentat 13, 17(Tent.DraftNo.13, 1961), 
cited in Williams v. District of Columbia, supra at 64-65 
n. 25. 
Nor can it be assumed that private citizens have been 
subjected unwillingly to language they find grossly and 
patently offensive. Even if the phrase identified by 
Lieutenant Richards at the motions hearing as the com-
mon enticement used by prostitutes when they take the 
initiative33 can be characterized as grossly offensive under 
contemporary community standards, Williams v. District 
of Columbia, supra, at 64, there is no evidence that pros-
titutes harrass the disinclined public with it. In fact, it is 
well known that, at least in Washington, D.C., prostitutes 
rarely approach anyone unless that person has given indi-
cations - some subtle, some scarcely so - that he (or 
she) wishes to be approached. Potential customers who 
purposefully seek out the areas frequented by prostitutes 
are easily recognizable, especially to one whose livelihood 
depends upon it. Public solicitation by the prostitute is 
generally limited to these Jess-than-reluctant listeners. 
Yet even if we were to accept the government's undocu-
mented supposition that some uninterested passersby are 
accosted and offended by persons soliciting for prostitu-
tion on the public streets, that fact alone would not war-
rant the sweeping prohibition proscribed by this statute. 
As the Supreme Court said in Cohen v. California, supra 
at 22: 
"[o) f course, the mere presumed presence of 
unwitting listeners or viewers does not serve 
automatically to justify curtailing all speech 
capable of giving offense. See, e.g., 'rganiza-
tion for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 
415 (1971)." 
Furthermore, today's citizen is bombarded with unwanted 
solicitations from every quarter, even though he be mildly 
vexed or massively annoyed by them. Street hawkers, 
door-to-door hucksters, and garish neon salutation be-
siege us; ubiquitous "muzak" follows us from super-
market to dentist's office. We cannot even turn on the 
radio in our own home or apartment without a barrage 
of jingles trying to "entice or persuade" us to buy some 
product that will give us "sex appeal." We must accept 
the sheer annoyance of these endless, mindless appeals, 
although they be as offensive to some persons as the 
prostitute's pitch on Fourteenth Street may be to those 
of other more delicate sensibilities. 
The Supreme Court has warned that merely because 
some persons in fact deem a particular form of expression 
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offensive, that in itself is not sufficient to justify a 
thoroughgoing prohibition of such language. The Court 
eloquently reminds us that: 
"[I] tis ... often true that one man's vulgarity 
is another man's lyric. Indeed we think it is 
largely because governmental officials cannot 
make principled distinctions in this area that the 
Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so 
largely to the individual." Cohen v. California, 
supra at 26. 
Where a verbal solicitation does so offend the sensibilities 
of any citizen that he or she feels moved to violent reac-
tion - a situation surely not shown to obtain here - a 
more narrowly drawn statute can afford the offended in-
dividual an adequate remedy. For example, D.C. Code 
§ 22-1121, making it unlawful to provoke a breach of the 
peace by acting in such a manner as to annoy, disturb, 
obstruct or be offensive to others, focuses narrowly on 
the problem of the individual grievously offended by cer-
tain language without trampling the rights of those who 
do not find such conversation inflammatory. An addi-
tional advantage of this or some alternative "disorderly 
conduct" statute is that, consonant with the teaching of 
Cohen, the individual citizen as complainant ascertains 
the offense, rather than permitting reliance on a police 
officer specifically detailed to make arrests, and whose 
quality of performance is measured by the number of 
successful prosecutions flowing from his efforts.34 
Perhaps more importantly,§ 22-2701 has in no way in-
corporated the distinction which the Supreme Court re-
peatedly has ~rawn between public and private impinge-
ments upon the right to be let alone. One may invoke the 
aid of government to safeguard his home from the intru-
sion of unwanted and offensive forms of expression; yet 
he cannot intrude his own tastes upon the general public 
by demanding suppression of all expression personally 
distasteful to him. In Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, 
343 U.S. 451 (1952), the Court upheld the prerogative 
of the D.C. Transit Company to pipe radio broadcasts 
aboard its buses despite the protests of certain passengers 
. who asserted invasion of their privacy and peace of mind. 
The Court said: 
"However complete his right of privacy may be 
at home, it is substantially limited by the rights 
of others when its possessor travels on a public 
thoroughfare or rides in a public conveyance." 
343 U.S. at 464. 
Similarly, in.Rowan v. Postmaster General,391 U.S. 728 
(1970), while validating a governmental scheme to facili-
tate exclusion from the home of mailed materials found 
offensive by the householder,. the Court also stressed that 
"we are often captives outside the sanctuary of the home 
and subject to objectionable speech." 397 U.S. at 739. 
Cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. at 25. As with so many 
rights, a balance must be struck between the freedom of 
one party to be undisturbed and the freedom of another 
to express himself. Neither is absolute. 
D.C. Code§ 22-2701 fails conspicuously to weigh in most 
of the primary factors relevant to striking this crucial 
balance. The statute makes no distinction between situ-
ations where the words spoken to solicit prostitution are 
spoken to a presumably willing police officer or to an 
unwilling private citizen; where their expression offends 
no one and where it threatens a breach of the peace; where 
they are spoken in public or in private. All these determi-
nations are essential to a decision whether the solicita-
tion, even if bothersome, is one which the government 
may constitutionally regulate. 
Above all, the statute clearly sweeps too broadly beyond 
the regulation of speech endorsed by the First Amend-
ment; its absolute prohibition of words spoken in any 
context to solicit for prostitution is impermissible. 
"Because First Amendment freedoms need 
breathing space to survive, government may 
regulate in the area only with narrow specificity." 
N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371U.S.415, 433. 
This Court perceives that whatever governmental interests 
might reside in the control of solicitation for prostitution 
could adequately be preserved by statutory regulation 
far short of complete prohibition. In an effort to cure 
this constitutional defect, one possible modification of 
the Section might involve application of the statute only 
to public solicitation. 
This assumes that some adequate definition of "public" 
could be fashioned. The tenuousness of this assumption 
is pointed up by In re Davis, 51 Cal. Rptr. 702 (Cal. App. 
1966). The defendant in Davis modeled a topless bathing 
suit before 150 adults in a restaurant-bar. She was con-
victed of violating a statute making it a crime to "wilfully 
and wrongfully" commit any act "which openly outrages 
public decency." The California appellate court found 
the statute to be unconstitutionally vague. In the course 
of its opinion the court noted that: 
" ... there is the problem of what is meant by 
'public decency.' Does the word 'decency' refer 
merely to bad manners or to immoral conduct 
or, more specifically, to immoral conduct with 
overtones of sex, eroticism or nudity? Does the 
term an 'act* * *which openly outrages public 
decency' refer to conduct decent and moral when 
done in private, but not when in public; or con-
duct indecent or immoral, or both, even if pri-
vate, which outrages the 'public' whether done 
in private or public? Finally, even if we decide 
which attitude of the public, the moral or the 
decorous, is the one which must be outraged, 
there is the question 'who is the public'? ... 
That answer is a great deal easier to give in a 
homogeneous society, in times of well estab-
lished precepts of morality and manners, such 
as Victorian England, than today ... When the 
statute speaks of 'public decency' does it pre-
suppose some kind of consensus among the 
majority of the public as to what is and what is 
not 'decent' and, if that assumption is wrong, 
to which segment of the public is the trier to 
look?" 51 Cal.Rptr. at 706-707. 
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Cf. this Court's recent opinion holding a somewhat simi-
lar District of Columbia statute to be unconstitutionally 
vague, District of Columbia v. Norfleet, et al., Cr. No. 
71214-71, at 5. Moreover, the Court notes, for reasons 
set forth in Part II of this opinion, a statute limited in its 
application to public solicitation could raise perilous ques-
tions of equal protection since it is well known, and the 
record established, that it is the poor female prostitutes, 
those coming from racial minority groups, who commonly 
"work the street," and are arrested, while higher priced 
call-girls ply their trade in hotels, apartments, and other 
less public situations without arrest.Given this problem, 
the Court is particularly reluctant to undertake judicial 
amendment of§ 22-2701 by ruling that it applies only to 
public solicitation. In any event, it is scarcely arguable 
that such modification, even absent equal protection 
snares, could save the statute from its other First Amend-
ment deficiencies. Accordingly, taking the language of 
the Section at its literal meaning it is clear that on its 
face and as applied,§ 2701 suffers from a fatal quantum 
of overbreadth (as distinguished from a question of vague-
ness), infringing constitutional freedoms.35 
The inordinate overextension of this statute, so dispro-
portional with any of the potential evils occasioned by 
solicitation for prostitution, contributes to the inevitable 
deduction that the government's primary concern here is 
to suppress prostitution because it is "immoral." Having 
reached what this Court believes to be the central, if tacit, 
state interest in these cases, it must now consider the 
broad question of the right of secular government to 
regulate public morality. 
The government contends that the state has the obligation 
and right to encourage upright and moral behavior on the 
part of its citizens. Prescinding from the obvious dilemma 
of choosing which of a host of conflicting ethical theories 
to promulgate (and who is to make the choice), affirma-
tion of governmental power to legislate morals is fraught 
with hazards. Upon the acceptance of such a view, the 
state may ultimately be given the right to regulate every-
thing. Indeed, there is little human conduct that could 
not be invested with moral implications; thus the sphere 
of permissible state regulation could soon devour all per-
sonal liberties in the name of community morality. But 
who shall be the final arbiter - Billy Graham or Billy 
Sunday, Carl Mcintyre or Karl Marx? This Court is con-
vinced that the proper perspective on regulation of public 
morals was enunciated by the well-known Wolfenden 
Report: · 
"Unless a deliberate attempt is to be made by 
society, acting through the agency of the law, 
to equate the sphere of crime with that of sin, 
there must remain a realm of private morality 
and immorality which is, in brief and crude 
terms, not the law's business."36 
The equivalence of crime with sin is surely not tenable 
in light of the privacy doctrine which we have been dis-
cussing. If the right to privacy has any viable meaning, it 
cannot be defeated by a mere assertion that the state has 
the right to regulate "immoral" conduct even though 
that conduct is not shown to hurt anyone. The advocacy 
of ethical theories is not synonymous with the demon-
stration of concrete societal harms. This Court concurs 
with Mill and Hart in insisting that it is only the latter 
which would justify a court's finding of an evil sufficient 
to warrant dilution of liberties. "So long as others are not 
harmed, we ... justly deserve freedom, even the freedom 
to be immoral."37 Upon thorough examination of the 
evidence pertinent to state claims (both stated and im-
plied) of the harms caused by prostitution, the Court is 
satisfied that they are spurious. The only injury which 
actually is traceable to consensual acts of prostitution 
between adults is the sense of indignation spawned in 
certain other persons. This so-called harm is not of an 
order cognizable by the law. Absent showing of a con-
crete evil that government has a right to prevent, prosti-
tution, like other consensual sexual activity, is not a fit 
matter for proscriptive legislation. The Court agrees that 
"sexual acts or activities accomplished without violence, 
constraint, or fraud, should find no place in our penal 
codes."38 Soliciting for prostitution in the District of 
Columbia is such an uninjurious activity; this perception, 
coupled with the constitutional rights here at stake, pre-
cludes the criminalization of this verbal behavior de-
manded by§ 2701. 
It must also be observed that criminalizatioq of "immoral" 
behavior collides with other difficulties in its drive to 
eradicate the universe of undesirable conduct. 
"The criminal code of any jurisdiction tends to 
make a crime of everything that people are 
against, without regard to enforceability, chang-
ing social concepts, etc .... The result is that 
the criminal code becomes society's trash bin. 
The police have to rummage around in this 
material and are expected to prevent everything 
that is unlawful. They cannot do so because 
many of the things prohibited are simply be-
yond enforcement ... ,,39 
This Court is reminded of the estimate by Kinsey and his 
associates that were all the laws concerning sex crimes 
rigidly enforced, ninety-five per cent (95%) of the male 
population would at one time or another be in a penal 
institution.40 To attempt thoroughgoing enforcement of 
the ban on soliciting prostitution in the District of Col-
umbia would be an enterprise almost equally ambitious, 
costly, and impracticable. The Court is further convinced 
that evidence cannot be adduced to show that enforce-
ment efforts under§ 2701 make any significant progress 
toward the elimination of solicitation for prostitution in 
this city. Naturally, it transcends the Court's province to 
make legislative determinations. The Court ventures these 
explorations simply to suggest the great morass of prob-
lems which one encounters in the attempt to regulate an 
area so broad and nebulous as public morals. For present 
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purposes it suffices to examine the impact of such regu-
latory efforts upon the exercise of constitutional rights. 
This Court finds that a generalized belief that certain 
conduct is immoral is no substitute for a showing of govern-
mentally cognizable harms caused by that conduct. Solic-
itation for prostitution may be activity that some, even 
many, in this community find morally reprehensible. 
Nonetheless, absent any demonstrated tangible harms 
emanating from this activity, particularly none sufficiently 
compelling to justify an abridgement of the fundamental 
rights involved here, the Court concludes that§ 22-2701 
is invalid as an unconstitutional invasion of defendants' 
rights of privacy and free speech. 
II The defendants also challenge the constitutionality of 
their prosecution under this statute on the grounds that 
such prosecution denies them the equal protection of the 
laws. The defendants present two major arguments to sup-
port this claim. They contend that the statute is discrim-
inatorily enforced against them as women on the basis of 
their sex. They further argue that a lesser standard of 
proof than is required to convict a man for homosexual 
solicitation is arbitrarily permitted in prosecutions of 
female prostitutes, thus denying them equal protection 
on the basis of their gender. It is not necessary to reach 
the latter contention, for an examination of the charge 
of discriminatory enforcement reveals that this claim 
independently warrants a dismissal of the informations 
against the defendants. 
In 1935, Congress repealed the 1892 Act which had gov-
erned prostitution,41 and replaced it with what is now 
D.C. Code § 22-2701.42 Where the old statute had made 
it unlawful for "any prostitute or lewd woman" to solicit 
for prostitution, the new version penalizes "any person" 
who so solicits, thus apparently making irrelevant the sex 
of the solicitor. Defendants have suggested that the pri-
mary intention of Congress was not the egalitarian goal 
of eliminating sexual bias in the law, but rather the im-
position of harsher punishment on female prostitutes 
than had been authorized under the earlier statute. They 
point out, for example, that the sex-specific language of 
the other statutes dealing with prostitution-related of-
fenses has been retained, giving rise to the inference that, 
in Congress's view, only women can be prostitutes, only 
154 women can commit prostitution, and only women can 
solicit for prostitution.43 
If the statute must be construed to mean that it applies 
only to females who initiate sexual transactions of the 
kind in question, then it creates a distinction among those 
capable of committing the acts depending solely on the 
sex of the offender. The use of the words "any person," 
however, suggests that the criminal penalty was meant to 
apply to anyone regardless of gender who initiates such 
a transaction. Even if the statute is thus to be construed 
as sex-neutral on its face, its deliberate enforcement only 
against the female prostitute to the exclusion of other 
possible offenders would likewise constitute a discrim-
inatory enforcement against female offenders on the sole 
basis of their sex. In either case, a classification by sex is 
made the grounds for differentiating among potential 
violators of the statute. 
It is necessary to consider, then, what standard is to be 
applied to determine whether such discrimination by sex 
violates constitutional guarantees of equal protection. 
While the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not by its terms apply to actions of the 
federal government, it is well settled that the Due Process 
clause of the Fifth Amendment exacts as high a standard 
of fair dealing and equal treatment from the federal auth-
ority as the Fourteenth Amendment requires of the 
states. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 
(1969); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964); Bolling 
v.Sharp~, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). Reference to the stan-
dards employed to establish whether discriminatory 
t~eat~ent by a state constitutes a denial of equal protec-
tion 1s thus helpful in determining whether the instant 
discrimination on the basis of sex is "so unjustifiable as 
to be violative of due process," Bolling v. Sharpe, supra 
at 499. 
Two standards of review have been developed to test the 
constitutionality of a discriminatory classification.44 The 
more permissive standard requires only that the discrim-
inatory classification bear some reasonable relationship 
to a valid state interest. See, e.g., Morey v. Doud, 354 
U.S. 457, 465 (1967).45 However, when the discrimina-
tion affects "fundamental rights or interests," e.g., · 
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 
(1966) (poll tax required as condition of franchise), or 
when the government classifies on a basis "inherently 
suspect," the discriminatory policy will be subject to 
"the most rigid scrutiny," Korematsu v. United States, 
323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). The government in such cases 
bears the burden of demonstrating that its classification 
is _necessary to some overriding governmental purpose. 
See,e.g.,Lovingv. Virginia, 388U.S.1,8-9,11 (1967); 
Mclaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964). 
The group of classifications deemed suspect includes, for 
example, race and lineage, e.g., Korematsu v. United 
States, supra; alienage, e.g., Takahashi v. Fish and Game 
~ommisio~, 33~ U.S. 410 (1948); and poverty, especially 
m connect10n with the exercise of the franchise, Harper 
v. State Board of Elections, supra, or the effectu-
ation of rights~ the criminal process, Douglas v. Cali-
fornia, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) and Griffin v. lllinois, 351 
U.S. 12 (1956). However, the Supreme Court has yet to 
treat classifications made on the basis of sex as "suspect." 
Indeed, just a little over twenty years ago, the view pre-
vailed that the legislature could draw "a sharp line be-
tween the sexes," Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 
(1948). Statutes singling out women for special treatment 
were historically justified by uncritical reference to time-
wor!1 homilies about the proper place of women in the 
home.46 
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Similarly, at one time it was settled doctrine that the 
Constitution permitted differential treatment of the 
races. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). But the 
Supreme Court has "not hesitated to strike down an in-
vidious classification even though it had history and tra-
dition on its side." Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 
(1968). It would, of course, be unthinkable today to 
allow the color of a person's skin to determine whether 
he receives equal treatment at the hands of government. 
Just as maturing concepts of fair and equal treatment led 
to the realization that racial discrimination has no place 
in our society, so the notion that woman's traditional 
role may justify an indulgent review of sex-based dis-
crimination has been emphatically rejected by state and 
lower federal courts in recent years.47 Decisions reflect-
ing social and economic conditions or legal and political 
theories of an earlier era no longer control our approach 
in appraising whether a particular classification violates 
the Equal Protection Clause. As the Supreme Court said 
in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, supra: 
"[T) he Equal Protection Clause is not shackled 
to the political theory of a particular era. In 
determining what lines are unconstitutionally 
discriminatory, we have never been confined to 
historic notions of equality, any more than we 
have restricted due process to a fixed catalogue 
of what was at a given time deemed to be the 
limits of fundamental rights (citations omitted). 
Notions of what constitutes equal treatment for 
purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do 
change." 383 U.S. at 669-70 (Emphasis in 
original.). 
Cases such as Bradwell, supra 
46
, upholding sex-based dis-
crimination by facile reference to Victorian pieties should 
properly be regarded as "museum pieces."48 
Last term the Supreme Court began to strike down state 
laws which discriminate against women, indicating that it 
is no longer willing to uphold such unequal treatment on 
the basis of outmoded and unsupported assumptions 
about woman's proper place. In Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 
71 ( 1971) the Court unanimously invalidated an Idaho 
statute that gave precedence to men over women in the 
granting of letters of administration. Reversing its tradi-
tional deference to sex-biased legislation, the Court de-
clared sex to be a classification "subject to scrutiny under 
the Equal Protection Clause," 404 U.S. at 75. Mere ad-
ministrative convenience could not justify the statute's 
discriminatory preference for members of one sex over 
members of the other, and the law was found to be "the 
very kind of arbitrary choice forbidden by the Equal Pro-
tection Clause," id. The Court in Reed was able to reach 
this result without resorting to the stricter test that 
would be required were sex considered a suspect classsi-
fication. Subsequently, in Stanley v. fllinois, 405 U.S. 
645 (1972), the Supreme Court held that an Illinois 
statutory scheme violated the Equal Protection Clause in 
denying unwed fathers the right to a hearing on their fit-
ness to have custody of their illegitimate children, a right 
enjoyed by the female parent. In Stanley, as in Reed, 
application of the more permissive "reasonable relation-
ship" test proved sufficient to invalidate the sex-based 
discrimination involved in the legislative choice. Thus, 
while the Court no longer looks with an uncritical eye 
upon classifications based on gender, it has not yet had 
occasion to rule that classifications based upon sex re-
quire the more stringent standard applied to suspect 
classifications. 
The Supreme Court of California, however, has affirmed 
that the time has come to treat sex-based classifications 
with the same rigid scrutiny applied to discriminations 
based upon race, ancestry and indigency. InSail'er Inn v. 
Kirby, 95 Cal. Rptr. 399, 285 P.2d 529 (1971), that 
court explicitly denominated sex a suspect classification, 
and consequently held unconstitutional a California statute 
excluding women from employment as bartenders. The 
California court reviewed the traits common to those 
classifications which have warranted extraordinary judi-
cial watchfulness, and concluded, as does this Court, that 
classifications on the basis of sex deserve the same careful 
scrutiny.49 
Three characteristics in particular seem to be shared by 
the classifications which have earned special treatment as 
"suspect." First, as the court noted in Sai/'er Inn: 
"Sex, like race and lineage, is an immutable trait, 
a status into which the class members are locked 
by the accident of birth." 95 Cal. Rptr. at 340. 
Distinctions between persons on the basis of factors over 
which they have no control, such as their gender, are 
"odious to a free people whose institutions are founded 
upon the doctrine of equality," Hirabayashi v. United 
States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943). 
In addition, membership in a suspect class "frequently 
bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to 
society," Sai/'er Inn v. Kirby, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 340. Thus, 
for example, " rw l ealth like race' creed or color' is not 
germane to one's ability to participate intelligently in the 
electoral process," Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections. 
383 U.S. at 668. Similarly, the wide range of professions 
and accomplishments of women today refutes the erst-
while notion that woman's abilities and interests are 
limited to the domestic sphere. 
Finally, relegating an entire class to an inferior status 
without considering the characteristics and capabilities of 
its individual members, Karczewski v. Baltimore and Ohio 
R.R., 274 F. Supp. at 179, reflects the stigma of inferi-
ority associated with suspect classifications. Sail'er Inn v. 
Kirby, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 340. The stereotype that blacks 
were fit only for servile menial jobs, and actually pre-
ferred their dependent position in society, is similar to 
the stereotype that women are weaker than men, intellec-
tually and emotionally as well as physically, and desire 
the dominion and protection of males. In both cases, a 
myth of inferiority has been perpetuated, resulting in the 
arbitrary exclusion of members of one race or sex from 
equal participation in societal benefits and responsibilities. 
As the Supreme Court of California aptly observed, 
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"[t] he pedestal upon which women have been placed 
has all too often, upon closer inspection, been revealed 
as a cage,"id. Since sex, like race or ancestry, is a trait over 
which a person has no control, and which bears no rela-
tion to individual capabilities, it must be regarded as an 
inherently suspect classification for the purposes of equal 
protection review. Accordingly, the government in de-
fending its presumptively invidious discrimination bears 
"a very heavy burden of justification." Loving v. Virginia, 
388 U.S. at 9. 
This burden is even greater where, as here, the discrim-
ination affects cherished personal liberties such as the 
freedom of speech and the right to privacy. The imposi-
tion of criminal liability upon members of one sex for 
their participation in a verbal negotiation for a private 
sexual transaction constitutes nothing less than a penalty 
for the exercise of rights guaranteed by the Constitution. 
The rights to free speech and privacy are contingently in-
fringed by prosecution under this statute. The statute 
works a more direct deprivation, however. Persons con-
victed under this section are subject to possible confine-
ment in a penal institution, an infringement of liberty of 
the most radical sort. 
"Among the rights protected by the Constitu-
tion, next to life itself, none is more basic than 
liberty ... No punishment which a state may 
impose weighs more heavily than imprisonment 
in an institution." Robinson v. York, supra 
note 47, 281 F. Supp. at 16. · 
The Supreme Court has warned that, in reviewing a 
criminal statute which embodies discrimination on a basis 
inherently suspect, "where the power of the State weighs 
most heavily upon the individual or the group, we must 
be especially sensitive to the policies of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause ... "McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 
at 192. 
Thus we are dealing with a prohibition which is enforced 
discriminatorily against members of suspect classification, 
resulting in the deprivation of fundamental liberties. None 
but the most urgent governmental interests can serve to 
justify such a policy. In determining whether D.C. Code 
§ 22-2701 violates the guarantee of fair treatment im-
plicit in the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, either 
on its face or as enforced, the Court must exercise the 
most rigorous scrutiny. 
It has been noted above that while D.C. Code§ 22-2701 
appears by its terms to apply equally to members of 
both sexes, it is entirely plausible that Congress did not 
mean by its use of the phrase "any person" to include 
anyone other than the female prostitute within the statu-
tory prohibition. To the extent that Congress may have 
intended to retain the former scope of the statute, and 
thus limit the class of potential offenders to women who 
invite men to engage in acts of prostitution with them, 
even the seemingly sex-neutral§ 22-2701 must be con-
sidered a denial of equal protection. Any construction of 
the statute to single out only the female prostitute for 
criminal penalties in connection with the formation of 
contracts for sexual activities violates the most funda-
mental principles of fairness. There is not~ing unique to 
the female negotiating such an arrangement with a male 
that justifies penalizing her while exculpating other per-
sons who may initiate such transactions. 
The notion that only a female can commit prostitution, 
and only by selling her favors to a man, perpetuates the 
myth of the "fallen woman" which has molded societal 
response to these issues. Abraham Flexner, an early in-
vestigator of prostitution, notes that "as a matter of 
history ... [t] he harlot has been branded as an outcast 
and flung to the wolves; she alone, never the man, her 
equal partner in responsibility."50 By consigning the 
female prostitute to a class by herself, a class of "un-
touchables," society creates a voluptuous icon who be-
comes the collective scapegoat; her persecution becomes 
expiation and exculpates those whose participation in 
her brand of sin is less visible.51 Her symbolic signifi-
cance impedes rational perception of her role and her 
rights. 
The belief that females who initiate sexual contracts with 
consenting adult males behave in any significant way dif-
ferently from the frequent male initiator of such arrange-
ments reflects insupportable social fictions. It must be 
reiterated that emerging constitutional principles of pri-
vacy make it highly improbable that the government has 
the authority to suppress such private arrangements at 
all.52 But even were the Court to assume arguendo that 
this type of consensual behavior may constitutionally be 
prohibited, no reason has been advanced, and none may 
be found, to distinguish between the female who engages 
in such transactions with men, and the other possible 
combinations of participants who make analogous 
arrangements. 
Certainly, where the crime lies solely in the solicitation, 
as here,53 and not in the act itself, even if the law could 
permissibly focus on the particular couple of female pros-
titute and male customer, it could not constitutionally 
punish the female for a verbal enticement while leaving 
the male free to make such advances with impunity. 
Lieutenant Richards testified at the hearing that to make 
out a case sufficient to sustain an arrest under § 2701, 
the constitutive component is the tender of an offer 
evidencing certain terms of the proposed agreement. Thus 
the crime, if there is one, is purely verbal; either party 
can commit the central element if he or she initiates the 
transaction by making an offer. 
To condition criminal liability entirely upon an arbitrary 
and unrelated factor such as the sex of the offender flies 
in the face of the most basic requirements of equal pro-
tection. An analogous situation of arbitrary discrimina-
tion was struck down by the Supreme Court in Skinner 
v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1941). In that case, a state 
statµte provided for compulsory sterilization of "habitual 
criminals," so designating persons convicted three times · 
of felonies involving "moral turpitude," but excepting 
those convicted of embezzlement and related crimes. 13
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Embezzlers, no matter how many times convicted, or 
how hardened in their criminal proclivities, escaped 
totally imposition of the severe impairment of personal 
liberty and bodily integrity implicit in forced steriliza-
tion. The Court found this differentiation repugnant to 
the Equal Protection Clause: 
"The guarantee of 'equal protection of the Jaws 
is a pledge of the protection of equal Jaws.' Yick 
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369. When the 
Jaw lays an unequal hand on those who have 
committed intrinsically the same quality of of-
fense ... it has made as invidious a discrimina-
tion as if it had selected a particular race or 
nationality for oppressive treatment.'' 316 U.S. 
at 541. 
If§ 2701 applies to females but not to males who have 
committed "intrinsically the same quality of offense," 
it makes just such an invidious discrimination, and on 
the basis of an inherently invidious classification as well. 
Statutes providing for differential punishment of offenders 
merely on the ground of their gender have been found to 
violate the principle of equal treatment in a number of 
lower court decisions in recent years. See, e.g., United 
States ex rel. Sumrel v. York, 288 F. Supp. 955 {d. 
Conn. 1968); United States ex rel. Robinson v. York, 
281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968); Commonwealth v. 
Daniels, 430 Pa. 642, 243 A.2d 400 (1968);Pennsylvania 
v. Stauffer, 214 Pa. Super. 113, 251 A.2d 718 (1969). In 
these cases, while members of both sexes could be con-
victed of the crimes for which the petitioners were sen-
tenced, females were subject to the threat of a longer 
period of incarceration than prescribed for males for the 
same offense. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 
Commonwealth v. Daniels, supra,: striking down that 
State's differential sentencing system for female of-
fenders, observed: 
"In particular, we fail to discern any reasonable 
or justifiable difference or deterrents between 
men and women which would justify a man 
being eligible for a shorter maximum prison 
term than a woman for the commission of the 
same crime ... "243 A.2d at 403 (emphasis in 
original). 
Nor does this Court discern any special factor of deter-
rence or other distinguishing element which might justify 
the exemption of a man from liability for soliciting the 
sexual transactions here in issue, while subjecting a woman 
to possible imprisonment and/or fine if she performs the 
same verbal offense. If arrest and criminal prosecution 
are seen to function at all as deterrents to recidivism, it 
seems likely that the application of these sanctions to 
the male patron would have ,at least as much efficacy in 
light of probable socioeconomic status and attendant 
class reactions. 
In the cases at bar, were the statute construed as retain-
ing. the original applicability fo female offenders only, it 
would entail a differential imposition of penal liability 
(on the basis of sex) similar to the unequal punishments 
found unconstitutional in cases such as Skinner, Robinson, 
and Daniels, supra. If the Court were constrained to con-
strue § 2701 as requiring such an invidious discrimina-
tion, the Court would have no choice but to find the 
statute invalid on its face. But, as noted above, a poten-
tially saving construction may be inferred from the 
statute's sex-neutral language. Under this interpretation 
of the section, it is not now necessary to find D.C. Code 
§ 22-2701 on its face a violation of equal protection 
principles. 
Defendants have raised another contention, however, 
which places the constitutionality of these prosecutions 
in grave doubt. Defendants urge that, despite the neutral 
wording of the statute, it is enforced with deliberate dis-
crimination against women, causing the same unconstitu-
tional denial of equal protection entailed had the statute 
by its terms singled out women for exclusive punishment. 
Ever since the leading decision of the Supreme Court in 
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 {1886), it has been 
clear that a government cannot do by administration 
what it could not do by legislation: 
"Though the law itself be fair on its face and 
impartial in appearance, yet if it be applied and 
administered by public authority with an evil 
eye and an unequal hand so as practically to 
make unjust and illegal discriminations between 
persons in similar circumstances, material to 
their rights, the denial of equal justice is still 
within the prohibition of the Constitution." 
118 U.S. at 3734. 
It cannot be questioned that law enforcement officials 
do not, by virtue of their office, acquire license to exer-
cise their authority in an arbitrary fashion. 
It is now settled law that a defendant in a criminal prose-
cution may.raise as a defense the discriminatory enforce-
ment of the statute against him as member of a particular 
class. See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448,456 {1962); 
Edelman v. California, 344 U.S. 337, 359 (1959);Ah Sin 
v. Wittman, 198 U.S. 500, 506 (1905). See also United 
States v. Steele, 461 F. 2d 1148 {9th Cir. 1972); United 
States v. Gebhart, 441F.2d 1261, 1265 {6th Cir. 1971); 
Washington v. United States, 130 U.S. App. D.C. 374, 
401 F.2d 915 (D.C. Cir. 1968);Moss v, Hornig, 3_14 F.2d 
89, 92 {2d Cir. 1963). These cases indicate that, while 
some selectivity in law enforcement is not in itself a viola-
tion of the constitutional rights of defendants, where the 
decision to pursue the particular group of defendants is 
"deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such 
as race, religion or other arbitrary classification," Oyler 
v. Boles, 368 U.S. at 456, their prosecution is tainted 
with invidious discrimination, and may be quashed. De-
fendants may prevail in their claim that unequal admin-
istration of the statute against them violates the prin-
ciples of equal protection upon a showing of "systematic 
or intentional discrimination" in the enforcement of the 
law against them. Edelman v. California, 344 U.S. at 359. 
The Court now examines the evidence in support of de-
fendant's allegation that the law enforcement agencies of 
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the District of Columbia pursue purposeful policies of 
discrimination in the application of§ 2701. In order not 
to find the section invalid on its face, the Court has al-
ready determined that the words "any person," defining 
potential offenders, must be given their literal asexual 
me.aning. The Court is convinced, however, that the con-
scious and deliberate policy of the Metropolitan Police 
and the United States Attorney is the enforcement of 
§ 2701 exclusively against female prostitutes, completely 
neglecting the potential liability of certain groups of 
males similarly situated. An analysis of classes of probable 
offenders will be briefly deferred; at this juncture it suf-
fices to observe that police efforts to apprehend and 
prosecute persons violating the proscription against 
soliciting prostitution are directed solely to the female 
offering her sexual services for a consideration, and to no 
other persons soliciting "for the purpose of prostitution." 
At the hearing upon these motions, Lieutenant Richards 
testified that the customary way of making prostitution 
arrests under§ 2701 involves the use of a police officer 
"decoy," wearing plainclothes and using an unmarked 
car, who cruises or strolls areas known to be frequented 
by female prostitutes and endeavors to be the recipient 
of a solicitation. As the Lieutenant's testimony confirms, 
all the officers composing the Prostitution, Perversion, 
and Obscenity squad are male. Indeed the membership 
of that squad has been exclusively male. The Vice Squad 
of the Third Police District - an autonomous unit un-
connected with the Morals Division - did essay an experi-
ment using policewomen as decoys who, upon being 
solicited for prostitution by male "johns," made arrests 
under § 2701. The experiment ceased abruptly. I ts de-
mise had nothing to do with a dearth of arrestees; on the 
contrary, the very success of the project signalled its end. 
The outcry of "respectable" gentlemen from the suburbs, 
sullied and embarrassed by their encounter with the law, 
soon reached the responsive ears of the police and the 
program was abandoned, never to be revived.s4 Thus the 
entire effort of the Metropolitan Police to enforce the 
ban on soliciting prostitution is aimed at females; males, 
whether patrons or prostitutes, are free to violate the law 
with impunity simply because of their gender. 
The evidence further indicates that this police policy is 
shared by the prosecutorial authorities. The language of 
the Information charging the offense of soliciting prosti-
tution is a blunt example of this discriminatory orienta-
tion. The printed form explicitly uses the female personal 
pronoun when referring to solicitation for prostitution, 
with the male pronoun reserved for charging soliciting for 
lewd and immoral purposes.ss This usage does not indi-
cate a proper apprehension of the neutral meaning of the 
statute, although it appears that it does reflect the beliefs 
and propensities of the law enforcement officials.s6 Such 
attitudes are inconsistent with constitutional notions of 
equal prote.ction. 
The Court finds further that the deliberate enforcement 
policies of the Metropolitan Police yield results quite 
consonant with their intent. Women are far more fre-
quently arrested, prosecuted, convicted and incarcerated 
for soliciting prostitution than their male counterparts. 
Hyperbole would be mere description in characterizing 
this disparity in treatment. These enforcement practices 
are the natural fruition of a discriminatory intent; to-
gether they work an invidious deprivation of rights 
against women. 
To demonstrate the pervasive nature of this discrimina-
tion, it is important to trace the successive steps of th~ 
criminal process and the impact of each of them on the 
female soliciting for prostitution, with an eye to the 
comparative outcome for the male solicitor of prostitu-
tion: Defendants have presented evidence documenting 
the disproportionate severity of the treatment reserved 
by the criminal justice administration system for females.s7 
Prostitution offenses account for a very great percentage 
of the women who are brought into the criminal process. 
In fact," (t] he largest number of women arrested locally 
are charged with the victimless crime of prostitution and 
related offenses."s8 Of the 2,791 police cases committed 
to pre-arraignment detention at the Women's Detention 
Center in 1969, twenty-one per cent {21%) were arrested 
on charges of soliciting prostitution, the largest percent-
age for any single offense.s9 • 60 Understandably, the 
government has not even attempted to demonstrate en-
forcement of§ 2701 against males soliciting for prostitu-
tion. Such a showing would require nothing short of 
sleight of hand. Instead the government relies upon the 
notion that the arrest of men for "soliciting for lewd 
and immoral purposes" is the male analogue of the female 
offense of soliciting prostitution (an assumption which 
is dealt with infra). Accordingly, a direct comparison of 
male and female arrests and dispositions for the identical 
offense of soliciting prostitution is not possible. 
At the prosecutorial level, the evidence confirms the 
enormously disproportionate enforcement of the solicit-
ing statute against females. Defendants have presented 
data compiled by the Criminal Clerk's Office of the 
Superior Court, revealing that during the years 1968, 
1969, and 1970, "soliciting prostitution" represented 
over eighty per cent (80%) of the offenses charged under 
D.C. Code § 22-2701. This charge, of course, is invoked 
only against females, as hinted by the language of the 
Information form. The remainder of the offenses charged 
under§ 2701 were "soliciting for lewd and immoral pur-
poses," the subsection administered as a male homo-
sexual offense. Not only were there relatively few male 
arrests under any provision of the statute, but once again 
the male patron soliciting for prostitution was exempted 
from the criminal process. 
Nor are the ensuing judicial proceedings shown to cor-
rect the bias of the initial stages of the process. The 
records of the District of Columbia Bail Agency support 
defendants' contentions; during the past 18 months, 
twenty-six per cent (26%) of those (i.e., females) arrested 
for soliciting prostitution were sentenced to terms of in-
carceration, the highest rate of incarceration for any of-
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fense in the District of Columbia. As defendants have 
pointed out, 42.5% of the total population confined at 
the Women's Detention Center in 1969 was committed 
for soliciting prostitution. These inmates accounted for 
69.1% of all misdemeanor commitments to that facility. 
Moreover, forty per cent ( 40%) of all inmates serving 
sentences of one month or more were sentenced for 
soliciting prostitution.61 Even were sentencing patterns 
for "soliciting for lewd and immoral purposes" deemed 
the relevant data for comparison, as the government sug-
gests, the evidence would be probative of great discrep-
ancies in treatment of the sexes. During the same year 
(1969), no more than one half of one per cent (0.5%) of 
the total population of the District of Columbia Jail was 
incarcerated for "soliciting for lewd and immoral pur-
poses." Even if the prostitution-related felony offenses 
of pandering, procuring, and attempted procuring are 
included in the count, the total number of men incarcer-
ated for all prostitution-oriented offenses only comprises 
approximately four per cent ( 4%) of the population of 
the District of Columbia Jail.62•6 
The Court perceives that males soliciting contracts for 
sexual behavior always fare much better in the criminal 
justice system than females. The male homosexual pros-
titute has considerable odds in his favor; the heterosexual 
male patron bears no risk at all. The female solicitor, the 
proverbial "fallen woman," is scapegoat for the sins of 
all. Her continued immolation at the hands of law en-
forcement personnel charged with administering equal 
justice under law can no longer be tolerated. This Court 
finds both the intent to discriminate as well as outright 
discriminatory practices exist in the application of 
§ 22-2701. 
The government, in attempting to rebut defendants' con-
tentions of unequal protection of the laws, has made 
arguments which demonstrate how completely it has 
failed to understand the issues in these cases. Defendants 
maintain, and the Court agrees, that certain classes of 
offenders are deliberately and arbitrarily exempted from 
the operation of§ 2701 to the detriment of others simi-
larly situated. In the instant cases, enforcement policies 
have been intentionally focused on women while ignor-
ing males equally likely to commit the offense of solicit-
ing prostitution. The government counters with the alle-
gation that males who solicit for lewd and immoral pur-
poses are subject to arrest and prosecution under§ 2701. 
The inference which the Court is asked to draw is that 
female arrestees for soliciting prostitution may therefore 
not be heard to complain of willful discrimination in the 
administration of the statute. The Court simply cannot 
adopt such an inference, for it is based upon a contention 
premised upon omissions and misconceptions. 
The arrest of females who solicit males and of males who 
solicit males obviously neglects whole categories of indi-
viduals who can invite, entice, or persuade another to 
participate in sexual activities for a consideration. It is 
manifest in fact as well as in logic that females can solicit 
other females, and that males can solicit females in the 
role of either buyer or seller of services. Even if we assume 
arguendo that prostitution encompasses only hetero-
sexual contracts for sexual activity ,64 there remain four 
possible modes of solicitation "for the purpose of prosti-
tution," with either male or female as vendor, and with 
either male or female as vendee. Even were the Court 
further to assume with the government that prostitution 
usually entails a female vendor and a male customer65 -
a formidable assumption to say the least - the male cus-
tomer may as readily solicit a female for the purpose of 
prostitution as she may solicit a male patron. The prose-
cution manages carefully to limit its delineation of the 
male solicitor to the homosexual, maintaining that the 
arrest of male solicitors for lewd and immoral purposes 
serves to balance the equation. In a world fortunately 
not yet unisexual, emphatically it does not. 
The government then offers a sort of informal demurrer, 
arguing that although the sort of disproportionate appli-
cation of the statute of which defendants complain may 
well exist, it presents no forbidden dsicrimination because 
it reflects cultural verities. Counsel for the government 
avers that it is a "basic cultural fact that very few males 
solicitate [sic] females for the act of prostitution (i.e., to 
be paid for having heterosexual acts with a female) ... " 66 
As has already been established, it is constitutionally im-
permissible for the statute to be construed on its face to 
mean that only women can engage in and solicit for pros-
titution. Therefore, the Court finds the government's 
present allegation that only women do solicit for the 
purpose of prostitution equally untenable because of its 
inconsistency both with logic and with the clear weight 
of the evidence. It plainly fails as a justification of current 
enforcement policies. 
The prosecution apparently believes that a male could 
only be said to solicit for prostitution if he were attempt-
ing to market his services as gigolo to a woman, and this 
is supposedly an uncommon occurrence. No definitive 
data have been presented on the prevalence of such prac-
tices, but such data are not necessary to a resolution of 
the issue. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that 
there is a patron involved in virtually every contract for 
prostitution, generally a male where the prostitute is 
female. From the recent discussion, supra, it is clear that 
either party, regardless of sex or transactional role, may 
be the initiator of that mutual encounter. Consequently, 
either party can violate the law prohibiting solicitation 
for purposes of prostitution. 
Nor does common information support the governmental 
allegation. The Kinsey report estimated that sixty-nine 
percent (69%) of the adult male population visit prosti-
tutes with varying degrees of frequency,67 while Benja-
min and Masters estimate eighty percent (80%).68 It defies 
reason to suppose that all these men, having sought out 
areas which female prostitutes are known to frequent, 
·have unanimously waited demurely on the sidewalk, hat 
in hand, to be approached by a female, especially in the 
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light of another "basic fact" of our culture, the male-
aggressor syndrome. As Lieutenant Bishop of the Morals 
Division said in explaining that undercover police have a 
difficult time getting the female prostitute to make a suf-
ficient, spontaneous solicitation to uphold a prostitution 
c_oriviction, "the normal individual out here that is looking 
for a woman is not quite that restricted."69 
Thus, a man who goes to an area frequented by prosti-
tutes with the intent of meeting a female prostitute is as 
likely to violate the statute as is the prostitute herself. 
Nevertheless, the Metropolitan Police Department concen-
trates all its enforcement efforts by the use of detectives 
and undercover men posing as potential customers of 
female prostitutes so that these prostitutes will be appre-
hended, and none of its efforts on posing as female pros-
titutes so that potential male customers will be appre-
hended. Under such circumstances, the Court concludes 
that the defendants have met their obligation to demon-
strate a systematic and intentional discrimination in the 
enforcement of D.C. Code§ 22-2701, Edelman v. Cali-
fornia, supra. The burden remains on the government to 
justify its failure to enforce the statute against males who 
violate its terms. However, no imperative governmental 
interest appears to explain the necessity for this discrim-
inatory enforcement policy. 
The United States Attorney at the hearing on these 
motions indicated that the purpose of this statute is to 
keep prostitution off the streets. Even if discriminatory 
enforcement of the statute were the only means by which 
this goal could be accomplished, a dubious proposition at 
best, the suppression of street solicitation is not so urgent 
a priority that it may be achieved at the expense of simple 
justice. Discriminations made along the lines of suspect 
classifications or affecting fundamental liberties have 
survived judicial review only in extreme circumstances. 
For example, the Japanese internment policy upheld in 
Korematsu v. United States, supra, was validated by the 
threat of impending military invasion and fear of wartime 
espionage.7° Comparison of the justification for that 
situation with the alleged perils in the instant case would 
approach the ridiculous. 
Governmental interests more on a par with those asserted 
here, such as the maintenance of civil order, have proved 
inadequate to justify an invidious discrimination. See, 
e.g., Dawson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 
220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955), affd per curiam sub nom. 
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 
877 (1955). Where basic rights are at stake, even-govern-
mental concerns as pressing as the fiscal integrity of the 
state have not availed to satisfy the demands of equal 
protection. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 
365 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, supra. 
However, even if the Court were to assume that the sup-
pression of street solicitation might conceivably be con-
sidered a "compelling" governmental concern, it remains 
unclear why discriminatory enforcement of the statute 
is necessary to that goal. See Loving v. Virginia, supra. To 
prove the required r.elationship between the discrimina-
tory enforcement of the statute against women and the 
purported goal, the government must show not only that 
this goal is positively furthered by the exclusive pursuit 
of female offenders, but also that the attempt to enforce 
the statutory prohibition against men would hinder th'e 
accomplishment of that goal or entail some other adverse 
consequence. Mere administrative inconvenience incident 
to the attempt to enforce the statute with an even hand 
would not justify the discrimination, even if the less ex-
acting "reasonable relationship" test were employed. Cf. 
Reed v. Reed, supra. However, far from involving any 
extraordinary and burdensome efforts on the part of the 
police, even-handed enforcement of the statute would 
appear relatively easy to accomplish. As male police of-
ficers are now deployed to await solicitation by female 
prostitutes, female police officers could similarly be used 
to attract solicitations from male patrons. The successful 
use of this approach for a time by one District Vice 
Squad attests to its feasibility. Presuming the propriety 
of continued criminalization of solicitation activity, the 
present "decoy" system for making arrests could easily 
be expanded to encompass both sexes. 
Just as there is no insurmountable practical barrier to 
the equal enforcement of this statute, there appears to be 
no practical advantage gained by its discriminatory appli-
cation. The tired routine of rounding up female prosti-
tutes and putting them away for a few weeks or months, 
only to see them reappear on the street when their time 
is up and their criminal record and lack of job training 
have closed the doors to other sources of income, indi-
cates that perhaps the least effective way to eradicate 
street solicitation is the arrest and conviction of the 
female prostitute. That the visible aspects of solicitation 
for prostitution persist despite the routine pursuit of the 
female prostitute casts serious doubts on the proposition 
that the governmental aim is advanced at all by these 
discriminatory practices. 71 
In focusing their repressive efforts solely on the female 
prostitute, the police have concentrated on attempting to 
curta.il the supply of the service contracted for, while 
totally ignoring the indispensible factor of demand. The 
continued existence of the institution of prostitution 
would seem to depend upon the interaction of both sup-
ply and demand. The fact that one female prostitute may 
negotiate a number of transactions in an evening, while 
the male customer may stop making advances after one 
successful solicitation, does not lead inexorably to the 
conclusion that the target of enforcement efforts should 
be the female who supplies the service. Such reasoning 
ignores the fact that, without customers to solicit, the 
prostitute would not seek her contacts on the street. A 
noted authority on the law's treatment of women has 
made this point succinctly: "The fact remains that the 
female prostitute simply could not exist without male 
customers. " 72 
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Unless a conscientious policy of enforcement is carried 
out against the men who demand and pay for this service, 
assumptions about the relative inefficacy of non-discrim-
inatory practices must remain mere speculation. It might 
well be discovered that a consistent and well-publfciied 
policy of arresting, prosecuting, convicting, and sentenc-
ing male customers under this section for soliciting pros-
titutes would quickly eliminate solicitation and accom-
plish the government's alleged aim.73 
The fact that adverse public response to the short-lived 
experiment of the Third District Vice Squad was ap-
parently so forceful, supra text at note 54, suggests that 
the average male customer could find the genuine threat 
of criminal prosecution a powerful deterrent. While the 
stakes may not be high for a woman who has already 
been stigmatized by arrest and conviction, and who has 
few alternatives in any event, the "occasional" customer 
from the suburbs, with a job and a middle-class reputa-
tion to protect, stands to lose a great deal by exposure to 
the criminal process. A serious enforcement effort 
directed at the male customer, maintained even in the 
face of public outcry, could make seeking the services of 
a prostitute so dangerous an indulgence that demand for 
such services would evaporate. Without the customer, the 
prostitute would have no reason to continue offering to 
supply the service. 
While this scenario is largely speculative, it is surely at 
least as reasonable as the set of assumptions which seem 
to underlie traditional efforts toward the suppression of 
prostitution-related activity. For all its inequitable short-
cuts, the current enforcement practice appears to have 
had little impact on the persistence of the demand for 
these services and therefore on the available supply to fill 
that demand. Where an invidious discrimination bears so 
little perceptible relation to the ends toward which it is 
ostensibly directed, and where it seems that even-handed 
application of the law would advance those ends with even 
greater efficiency, the discrimination cannot satisfy the 
requirement of a "reasonable relationship" between end 
and means, much less the more stringent requirement of 
its necessity to some compelling governmental interest. 
In the final analysis, the solicitation prohibited by 
§ 22-2701 is the same offense whether committed by a 
female prostitute or by a male patron. Penalizing the 
prostitute while absolving the patron reflects sheer sexual 
bias. As one perceptive court long ago observed: 
"The men create the market, and the women 
who supply the demand pay the penalty. It is 
time that this unfair discrimination and injustice 
should cease ... The court is aware that it has 
been the custom heretofore followed to arrest 
the women and let the men go; but the time has 
come when the custom cannot longer be per-
mitted to continue ... The practical application 
of the law as heretofore enforced is an unjust 
discrimination against women in the matter of 
an offense, which in its very nature, if com-
pleted, requires the participation of men." People 
v. Edwards, 180 N.Y.S. 631, 634-5 (1920). 
While a finding that§ 22-2701 is applied in violation of 
basic tenets of equality is founded upon the map.ifest sex 
discrimination apparent in these cases, the court observes 
that§ 2701 is also enforced primarily against members of 
racial minorities and poor people. Such enforcement 
would, of course, involve more traditional suspect classi-
fications and raise additional problems of equal protec-
tion. The interrelationships of race and poverty in 
America have been well documented in contemporary 
writing. Their coincidence in a given situation constitutes 
an especially suspect classification. Accordingly, where 
the factors of sex, race, and class all interpenetrate, and 
persons characterized by this three-fold constellation of 
traits are singled out for discriminatory treatment by the 
terms or application of a statute, the classification is so 
suspect that it is nearly impossible to imagine a state in-
terest sufficiently compelling to justify it. It is quite clear 
that the "soliciting prostitution" statute as applied ap-
pears to involve such a multiple classification. 
The enforcement practices of§ 2701 are directed over-
whelmingly to the streetwalking prostitute who is much 
likelier than her "call-girl" counterpart to be a lower-class 
black woman.74 Since the call-girl by definition does not 
approach her clientele to generate business but waits to 
be sought out, it is most unlikely that she could be con-
sidered the solicitor of a transaction. The efforts of the 
Metropolitan Police to enforce § 2701 are admittedly 
aimed at the streetwalker; their efficacy is attested by 
the population of the Women's Detention Center. Eighty-
six per cent (86%) of the women incarcerated for solicit-
ing prostitution in 1969 were black. 75 Similarly, the 
Annual Police Report for 1971 shows that 83% of female 
arrestees for any misdemeanor-level offense were black.76 
Moreover, most male patrons of female prostitutes are 
shown to be white, middle-class, middle-aged suburban-
ites.77 (In fact, the members of the Prostitution, Perver-
sion, and Obscenity Squad are all white males, this com-
position having been deliberately chosen so that the 
officers might better resemble the average customer of 
female prostitutes). It is not difficult to image the reti-
cence of certain law enforcement personnel to arrest 
middle-class white males, especially when the other 
potential target of the enforcement campaign is typically 
a lower-class black woman. 
Where the same offense is likely to be committed by both 
groups with comparable frequency, with enforcement 
practices resulting in an overwhelming concentration of 
arrests, prosecutions, and convictions within one group 
characterized by a certain constellation of traits, and 
where these traits are all suspect classifications, the infer-
ence of impermissible intent on the part of the authorities 
is inescapable. Such an inference, however, is not required 
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by the classification relied on by defendants here (viz., 
sex), for the evidence already cited reveals a deliberate 
and unjustifiable policy of discriminatory enforcement 
against women. 
The practical application ofD.C. Code§ 22-2701 exclu-
sively against the female offender constitutes a discrim-
ination so unjustifiable as to violate due process notions 
of equal protection of the laws. These defendants, as 
members of the class against whom the law is discrim-
inatorily enforced, may not constitutionally be singled 
out for prosecution on a basis so arbitrary as their sex. 
Thus, the court is presented with a situation in which a 
suspect classification is used as the basis for a determina-
tion entailing potential deprivation of liberty for engaging 
in conduct that is not properly the state's concern. In 
such a case, fairness demands proof of a compelling state 
interest; this demand remains unfulfilled. Accordingly, 
the information must be dismissed as irreparably tainted 
with the invidious discrimination of the selective enforce-
ment which produced them. 
Conclusion 
The holdings of this Court on the constitutional issues 
presented in these cases collectively and independently 
require the invalidation ofD.C. Code§ 22-2701. 
The informations are hereby dismissed. 
1 Section 22-2701 provides: 
"Prostitution - inviting for purposes of. pro· 
hibited. It shall not be lawful for any person 
to invite, entice, persullde, or to address for 
the purpose of inviting, enticing or persuad-
ing any pexson or persons sixteen years of 
age or over in the District of Columbia, for 
the purpose of prostitution, or any _other 
immoral or lewd purpose, under a penalty of 
not more than $250.00 or imprisonment for 
not more than ninety days, or both." 
2 No doubt a fact infrequently realized or 
even understood by many. See fn. 3, infra. 
3 The first statutory control over prostitution 
in the District of Columbia came on July 29, 
1892, when Congress passed "an act for the 
preservation of the public peace and protec-
tion of property within the District of Col-
umbia." Act July 29, 1892, ch. 320, 27 Stat. 
322. Section 7 of that Act (27 Stat. 323) 
made it unlawful for "any prostitute or lewd 
woman to invite, entice, persuade, or to 
address for the purpose of inviting, enticing, 
or persuading any person or persons ... for 
the purpose of prostitution ... ". Section 7 
of the 1892 Act was specifically repealed on 
August 15, 1935, when Congress passed "an 
act for the suppression of prostitution in the 
District of Columbia." Act August 15, 1935, 
ch. 546, 49 Stat. 651, 652. This new Act 
(Section 1) broadened the scope of the of-
fense set forth in Sec. 7 of the 1892 Act in 
several areas: the persons covered shifted 
from "any prostitute or lewd woman" to 
"any person"; the offense was extended to 
cover not only solicitation for the purpose 
of prostitution, but also "any immoral or 
lewd purpose"; the maximum penalty was 
increased; and provisions were added for 
suspension of sentence and rehabilitation. 
See D.C. Code Sec. 22-2703. Section 1 of 
the 1935 Act has been amended twice. Act 
June 29, 1953, ch. 159, Sec. 202(b), 67 
Stat. 93. The changes brought about by 
these amendments relate primarily to limit-
ing the age (to persons sixteen years of age 
or over) of solicitation and increasing the 
maximum penalty for solicitation. The legis-
lative history of D.C. Code Sec. 22-2701 as 
well as the plain meaning of the words make 
it clear that the statute under which defend-
ants are charged prohibits soliciting prostitu-
tion. Various sections in the D.C. Code at-
tempt to cover other activities related to 
prostitution. See, e.g., Sec~ 22-2705 (Pander-
. ing Act) making it unlawful to induce or 
compel a female to become a prostitute or 
engage in prostitution; Sec. 22-2707 prohibit-
ing the act of procuring a female to live in 
prostitution; Sec. 22-2709 and Sec. 22-2710 
making it illegal to procure or force a female 
to engage in acts of prostitution; Sec. 
22-2711 declaring unlawful the procuring of 
a female for the immoral enjoyment of a third 
person; Sec. 22-2712 prohibiting the opera-
tion of a house of prostitution staffed by 
female prostitutes. 
4 Nor should it be: the right of privacy, dis-
cussed infra, applies equally to acts of prosti-
tution as to other consensual sexual behavior 
between adults in private. 
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